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Consent, Not Morality, As The Proper
Limitation On Sexual Privacy
By CARLETON H. A. TABER*
Introduction
This note explores the boundaries encompassing the right of sexual
decisional privacy. The question analyzed is whether the recognized right of
sexual privacy in marriage is capable of extension beyond the marriage
relation; "the issue centers not around morality or decency, but the constitu-
tional right of [sexual] privacy."' I The vehicle for this analysis is Lovisi v.
Slayton,2 in which a husband and wife challenged, by means of a petition
for habeas corpus, their convictions under Virginia's "crimes against nat-
ure" statute3 for the wife's committing fellatio with her husband while in the
presence of a third person in their bedroom.4 Although the wife was also
convicted of fellatio with the third party, 5 the statute was challenged in
federal court only as it applied to the Lovisis' consensual sodomy with each
other. 6 The district court acknowledged the existence of a right of privacy
that might cover all three participants in this case,7 but decided that they had
lost the right of privacy by failing to prevent subsequent dissemination of
pictures taken of their sexual activities.8 The court of appeals similarly
* Member, second year class.
1. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1205 (E.D. Va. 1975) (Mehrige,
J., dissenting) (declaratory judgment action unsuccessfully challenging Virginia's sodomy stat-
ute as applied to homosexuals), aff'd mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
2. 363 F. Supp. 620 (E.D. Va. 1973), aff'd, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct.
485 (1976).
3. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-212 (1960) (current version at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-361
(1975)): "Crimes against nature-If any person shall carnally know in any manner any brute
animal, or carnally know any male or female person by the anus or by or with the mouth, or
voluntarily submit to such carnal knowledge, he or she shall be guilty of a felony and shall be
confined in the penitentiary not less than one year nor more than three years." Since the
Lovisis' convictions, the statute has been amended to provide for a five year maximum penalty,
and now provides for a separate penalty if force is employed. The statute makes no allowance
either for the locus of the activity or the participants involved. See text accompanying notes
175-76 infra.
4. 363 F. Supp. at 622.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 621.
7. Id. at 626.
8. Id. at 627.
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found that the couple had a right of privacy, but held that the presence of a
third party destroyed the right by making their actions public.
9
The Supreme Court's denial of certiorari10 left unanswered several
questions regarding the scope of the right of decisional privacy, which this
note attempts to resolve. The discussion begins by tracing the genesis and
evolution of this constitutional right of privacy from its original conception
as a function of the marriage relation to its current status as an individual
right. Then the author suggests that implicit in the present state of the law is
a right of decisional privacy with respect to sexual matters. Finally this note
reviews the Lovisi opinions and analyzes how the application of the pro-
posed right of decisional privacy would have affected their outcome.
I. Privacy
A. Frontier Concept
In formulating the Bill of Rights, the founding fathers and the first
Congress sought to provide protection for the individual against abusive
intrusions by the new government." In particular, the Third 2 and Fourth
Amendments 13 were aimed at providing and protecting a measure of privacy
for the homes of citizens.14 In a population that was relatively homogene-
ous, with a large similarity of basic values within the communities, little
more than protection of one's physical privacy was necessary.' 5 Sheer
9. 539 F.2d at 351.
10. 97 S. Ct. 485 (1976).
11. "The significance of the specifically enumerated rights is that they are examples of the
proper balance to be struck between the individual and society in areas in which the framers,
because of their experience with the particular dangers to individual freedom in their time,
could accommodate the competing interests." Wheeler & Kovar, Roe v. Wade: The Right of
Privacy Revisited, 21 U. KAN. L. REV. 527, 538 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Wheeler & Kovarl.
12. "No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of
the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law." U.S. CONST., amend.
III.
13. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST., amend. IV.
14. The Third Amendment sought to preserve the home-as-castle concept of the common
law. In addition it was intended to give some effect to the English Petition of Right, 4 Charles I,
June 7, 1628, which attempted to remedy the practice of forced quartering of soldiers. The
Fourth Amendment protected against the General Warrant, which had been used, until ruled
illegal in 1765, to arrest and search the premises of all persons suspected of being involved in a
crime, though not named in the warrant. The new nation did not intend to give up this hard-won
freedom from such persecution. 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 647-50 (5th ed. 1891); H. TAYLOR, THE ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 233-34 (1911).
15. See A. Simmel, Privacy is Not an Isolated Freedom, in PRIVACY 71,76-78 (J. Pennock
& J. Chapman eds. 1971); Comment, The Concept of Pivacy and the Fourth Amendment, 6 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 154, 158 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Concept of Privacy].
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physical distance also helped insulate whatever conflicts in lifestyle that
may have existed. 16 When this physical buffer proved inadequate to provide
natural privacy for grossly disparate values, there existed the alternative of
forging a new life in the expanding frontier. There the "mores of society
forbade inquiry into a man's past." 7 With the trend toward urbanization at
the end of the nineteenth century, the physical opportunity for isolating
oneself diminished.18 A need for some sort of artificial frontier began to be
more acutely felt. Nowhere in the Constitution, however, could one find its
explicit protection. 19
B. Evolution of Personal Privacy
The first movement toward recognition of an implicit right of privacy
came, quite naturally, in the area of the Fourth Amendment protection from
unreasonable searches and seizures. An expansive interpretation of the
amendment saw it as protecting the "sanctity of a man's ' home and the
privacies of life." 20 The essence of a Fourth Amendment violation at that
time was "the invasion of [a person's] indefeasible right of personal securi-
ty, personal liberty and private property," 21 a right held "sacred" by the
Court. 22 Although the Fourth Amendment continued to be regarded largely
in rigid terms of property interests, 23 more recognition was being given to
the philosophical nature of this emerging artificial frontier of privacy.
Justice Brandeis, in his famous dissent in Olmstead v. United States,24 the
first wiretapping case, viewed the Fourth Amendment as providing this
expanded protection:
The protection guaranteed by the [Fourth and Fifth] Amendments
is much broader in scope. The makers of our Constitution under-
took to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness.
They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his
16. See Concept of Privacy, supra note 15, at 158.
17. Dixon, The Griswold Penumbra: Constitutional Charter for an Expanded Law of
Privacy, 64 MICH. L. REV. 197, 202 (1965).
18. See Towe, A Growing Awareness of Privacy in America, 37 MoNT. L. REv. 39, 39-43
(1976); Concept of Privacy, supra note 15, at 161.
19. "[S]ince it is not until the 1890's that the impact of the privacy concept began to be
felt, where, in a constitution drafted a hundred years earlier, can we look for a protection of
that concept?" Comment, The Constitutional Rights of Privacy-'"A Sizeable Hunk of Liber-
ty," 26 MD. L. REv. 249, 250 (1966).
20. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (compelling production of personal
papers in criminal trial held violative of Fourth and Fifth Amendments).
21. Id. (emphasis added).
22. Id.
23. In order for the Court to recognize a search as unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment it had to involve a search or seizure of tangible property and an actual trespass to
obtain it. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928) (unauthorized wiretapping by
police upheld in absence of physical entry into defendant's home to effect "tap").
24. 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928).
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feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain,
pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things.
They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts,
their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the
Government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect that
right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the
privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be
deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.25
The Supreme Court did not explicitly recognize privacy as a value
protected by the Fourth Amendment until 1967 in Katz v. United States.
26
Katz overturned a conviction based on evidence procured by recording,
without a warrant, a conversation in a "bugged" telephone booth.27 Despite
the lack of physical trespass, previously essential to a finding of illegal
search and seizure, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment protected
"people, not places.' '28 "What a person knowingly exposes to the public,
even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." ' 29 Therefore,
seclusion in its technical sense of "isolation" is no longer necessary for
Fourth Amendment protection to attach. What is now determinative is
whether the person has displayed a reasonable expectation of privacy. 30 As
defined by Justice Harlan in his concurrence, this standard has two ele-
ments: "first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation
of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared
to recognize as 'reasonable.' 1 Katz thus completed the transition of
Fourth Amendment analysis from its original emphasis on locale to an
emphasis on the parties themselves and whether there was a reasonable
expectation of privacy.
32
25. Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
26. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
27. Id. at 355-57.
28. Id. at 351. "The question, however, is what protection it affords to those people.
Generally, as here, the answer to that question requires reference to a 'place.'. . . Thus a
man's home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy. . . . [Similarly, a
telephone booth] is a temporarily private place whose monetary occupant's expectations of
freedom from intrusion are recognized as reasonable." Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring)
(citation omitted).
29. Id. at 351-52 (citations omitted).
30. Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring). See generally Note, The Reasonable Expectation of
Privacy-Katz v. United States, A Postscriptum, 9 IND. L. REV. 468 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Katz, A Postscriptum].
31. 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
32. Katz demonstrates that at least some activities formerly protected only within the
home may now be eligible for protection outside the home: "[W]hat he sought to exclude when
he entered the telephone booth was not the intruding eye-it was the uninvited ear." Id. at
352.
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Two years after Katz the Court decided an important obscenity case,
Stanley v. Georgia,33 which also contributed to the developing concept of
privacy. In Stanley, officers were executing a warrant to search for evidence
of bookmaking, but instead they uncovered material considered obscene
under local law.34 The Court held that even though all the avenues of
distribution of pornography could be regulated under the state police pow-
er, 35 mere private possession in the home could not.36 The Court saw the
state's interest as regulating morality: "Obscenity, at bottom, is not crime.
Obscenity is sin." 37 While morality alone would suffice as a basis for
regulating public suppression of obscenity, the Court rejected the state's
asserted interest in morality as insufficient by itself to justify invading the
privacy of the home. 38 Stanley and Katz together therefore provide potential
double protection for privacy-protection of the home as well as the persons
therein.
The protection given in Stanley to a person's "right to satisfy his
intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy of his own home," ' 39 by
viewing material illegal elsewhere, is also capable of extension. Because
this right is related to location, and is not necessarily personal, it may extend
to adult visitors who consensually view such material!n0 Further, so long as
33. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
34. Id. at 558.
35. See, e.g., United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973) (transportation of obscene
material by common carrier); United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels, 413 U.S. 123 (1973) (confisca-
tion by customs officials of imported obscene material intended for private use); United States
v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971) (confiscation of obscene material intended
for commercial distribution); United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971) (knowing use of mails
for delivery of obscene materials).
36. 394 U.S. at 559. "(Wle do not think that the obscenity statutes reach into the privacy
of one's own home." Id. at 565. "[There exists a 'myriad' of activities which may be lawfully
conducted within the privacy and confines of the home, but may be prohibited in public."
Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 503 (Alas. 1975) (private possession of marijuana in the home).
Nevertheless, "even in connection with the penumbra of home-related rights, the right of
privacy in the sense of immunity from prosecution is absolute only when the private activity
will not endanger or harm the general public." Id. at 500. See Note, Roe and Paris: Does
Privacy Have a Principle?, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1188 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Roe and
Paris.
37. 394 U.S. at 565 n.8 (quoting Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obsceni-
ty, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 391, 395 (1963)).
38. "For also fundamental is the right to be free, except in very limited circumstances,
from unwanted governmental intrusions into one's privacy." Id. at 564 (emphasis added).
39. Id. at 565.
40. "The Constitution extends special safeguards to the privacy of the home, just as it
protects other special privacy rights." United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 142 (1973) (trans-
portation of obscene material by common carrier). Lacking a compelling interest in regulating
consensual activity in the home, the state could not regulate a visitor any more than it could the
resident. See 25 EMORY L.J. 959, 976 (1976); Roe and Paris, supra note 36, at 1185-89; cf.
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. U.S. 1, 15-18 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (zoning
ordinance narrowly defining "family" upheld). "[Tihe right to invite the stranger into one's
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the activity does not conflict with a compelling state interest, other methods
of fulfilling emotional needs, such as unconventional sexual practices,
ought to be equally entitled to protection in the home.
41
H. Decisional Privacy and its Application to Sexual Activity
Paralleling the Katz shift away from the home-oriented focus of the
Fourth Amendment was the development of personal privacy rights under
the "liberty" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 42 This clause protects
those rights that are fundamental or "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty." 4 3 In order to determine whether a new right is to be protected, the
Court must look to tradition and history to decide whether it is "so rooted in
the [collective] conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."I
"Where there is a significant encroachment upon [a fundamental] personal
liberty, the State may prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest
which is compelling." 45 Further, the statute "must be narrowly drawn to
express only the legitimate state interests at stake."
46
The Court has recognized the family unit as always having been an
essential part of our society: "Marriage and procreation are fundamental to
the very existence and survival of the race." 47 To ensure the viability of the
family unit, the Court has given great deference to basic decisional rights
regarding procreation48 and the raising of children. 49 These decisions
home is too basic in our constitutional regime to deal with roughshod." United States Dep't of
Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 543 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) (denial of food
stamps due to arbitrary definition of "household").
41. "[S]ocially condemned activity, excepting that of demonstrable external effect, is and
was intended by the Constitution to be beyond the scope of state regulation when conducted
within the privacy of the home." Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1205
(E.D. Va. 1975) (Mehrige, J., dissenting), aff'd mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976). "Recent Supreme
Court decisions make it clear that even the states, which possess a general police power not
granted to Congress, cannot in the name of morality infringe the rights to privacy . . in the
h.me." Moreno v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 345 F. Supp. 310, 314 (D.D.C.), aff'd,
413 U.S. 528 (1973) (emphasis in original). See generally W. BARNETT, SEXUAL FREEDOM AND
THE CONSTITUTION 58-60 (1973) hereinafter cited as BARNETTr.
42. "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law. ... U.S. CONST., amend. XIV.
43. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,
325 (1937)). See generally Heymann & Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and Its
Critics, 53 B.U.L. REV. 763 (1973).
44. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
45. Id. at 497 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524
(1960)); see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
46. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
47. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
48. E.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (compulsory sterilization of certain
classes of criminals).
49. E.g., Wisconsin v. Yodei, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (compulsory school attendance law
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created a "private realm of family life which the state cannot enter" 50
without a compelling justification. The result of this expansion of the right
of family autonomy was the affirmative recognition, in Griswold v. Connec-
ticut,5 1 of a fundamental right of privacy under the liberty clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
A. Griswold v. Connecticut
The appellants in Griswold, the executive and medical directors of the
local Planned Parenthood Leauge, provided married couples with informa-
tion, instruction, and medical advice regarding contraception. For these
services they were charged with aiding and abetting the violation of a
Connecticut statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives. 52 Building on the
recognized special protection given the family and home, 53 the Court held
that the married couple could not be prosecuted under this statute because a
zone of privacy insulated them from state regulation of their procreational
decisions. 54 In so holding, the Court extended derivative privacy protection
to the appellants, who had shared in the married couple's decision. 55
Without such protection, the couple would have been denied the means to
effectuate their right of decisional privacy.
Locating the basis for this right proved difficult for the Court. The
majority, in an opinion written by Justice Douglas, felt that associated with
explicit guarantees in certain amendments to the Constitution were implicit
peripheral rights that made the explicit rights more secure. 56 Surrounding
these peripheral rights were penumbras protecting individual privacy from
governmental intrusion. 57 These penumbras drew their "life and substance"
from emanations of specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights. 58 Together, the
emanations from the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments
formed a zone of privacy, which in turn encompassed the marriage relation-
ship.5
9
inapplicable to Amish children); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (parochial
education); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (teaching of foreign language in school).
50. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (distribution of religious material by
minor).
51. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
52. Id. at 480.
53. See text accompanying notes 47-50 supra.
54. 381 U.S. at 485.
55. "This law, however, operates directly on an intimate relation of husband and wife and
their physician's role in one aspect of that relation." Id. at 482.
56. Id. at 484-85.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 485.
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The statute, by regulating the use rather than the less onerous alterna-
tives of sale or distribution of contraceptives, had the greatest potential for
intruding on the privacy surrounding the marital relationship. 6° Raising the
specter of enforcement only by invasion of the marital bedroom, Justice
Douglas held the means employed by the State impermissible as "repulsive
to the notions of privacy.'61
Justice Goldberg concurred, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice
Brennan. Justice Goldberg argued that personal rights found to be funda-
mental were protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of liberty.
62
Using the Ninth Amendment as support for his thesis that the Constitution
protected rights not expressly stated, 63 he concluded that marital privacy
was fundamental under the Fourteenth Amendment: "The entire fabric of
the Constitution and the purposes that clearly underlie its specific guarantees
demonstrate that the rights to marital privacy and to marry . . . are of
similar order and magnitude as the fundamental rights specifically protect-
ed.'' 64 Because Justice Goldberg found the state's interest in discouraging
extramarital relations insufficiently compelling, he agreed that the statute
was unconstitutional.65
Justice Harlan concurred only in the result because he did not see the
question as dependent on the "letter or penumbra of the Bill of Rights." 66
For him, the issue was whether the statute violated basic values "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty" 67 under the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Referring to and incorporating his dissent in Poe v.
Ullman,68 Justice Harlan reasoned that when morality alone was used to
justify a statute, the choice of means became relevant. 69 In this instance, the
60. Id.
61. Id. at 485-86.
62. Id. at 486.
63. Id. at 487-96. See generally Bertelsman, The Ninth Amendment and Due Process of
Law-Toward a Viable Theory of Unenumerated Rights, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 777 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Bertelsman]; Redlich, Are There "Certain Rights . . . Retained by the
People"?, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 787 (1962); Ringold, The History of the Enactment of the Ninth
Amendment and its Recent Development, 8 TULSA L.J. 1 (1972).
64. 381 U.S. at 495 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
65. Id. at 497-99. Even if marital fidelity were perceived as a valid state interest, Justice
Goldberg felt that it could "be served by a more discriminately tailored statute, which does not,
like the present one, sweep unnecessarily broadly, reaching far beyond the evil sought to be
dealt with and intruding upon the privacy of all married couples." Id. at 498.
66. Id. at 499 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
67. Id. at 500 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
68. 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (an earlier challenge to the statute struck down in Griswold
dismissed for lack of justiciability).
69. "The secular state is not an examiner of consciences: it must operate in the realm of
behavior, of overt actions, and where it does so operate, not only the underlying, moral
purposes of its operations, but also the choice of means becomes relevant to any Constitutional
judgment on what is done." Id. at 547 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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state sought to enforce its moral judgment regarding contraceptives by
"intruding upon the most intimate details of the marital relation with the full
power of the criminal law. "70 This involved what "must be granted to be a
most fundamental aspect of 'liberty,' the privacy of the home in its most
basic sense, and it is this which requires that the statute be subjected to
'strict scrutiny.' "71 Justice Harlan concluded that the means were too
intrusive: while the right of privacy was not an absolute, 72 due process
prohibited regulating the details of marital intimacy by means of the crimin-
al law.
73
Justice White, concurring in the judgment, also relied on the Four-
teenth Amendment. He felt that the right to be free from regulation of the
marital relation "come[s] to this Court with a momentum for respect lacking
when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from shifting econom-
ic arrangements." 74 He did not, however, adopt the privacy argument
espoused in the other opinions. 75 Instead, he concluded that the statute, by
its inclusion of married couples, impermissibly interfered with the "realm
of family life."
76
Justices Black and Stewart each dissented and joined the other's opin-
ion. Justice Black could find the statute violative of no explicit constitution-
al guarantee, 77 and he was unwilling to read an implied protection into the
Constitution. 7 He reproved the Court for using the due process clause to
find an implicit right of privacy, for that allowed a statute's constitutionality
to be measured "by our belief that legislation is arbitrary, capricious or
unreasonable, or accomplishes no justifiable purpose, or is offensive to our
70. Id. at 548.
71. Id.
72. "'mhe family . . . is not beyond regulation,' . and it would be an absurdity to
suggest either that offenses may not be committed in the bosom of the family or that the home
can be made a sanctuary for crime. The right of privacy most manifestly is not an absolute." Id.
at 552 (citation omitted).
73. 381 U.S. at 500. "In sum, the statute allows the State to enquire [sic] into, prove and
punish married people for the private use of their marital intimacy.
"[This involves what] must be granted to be a most fundamental aspect of, 'liberty,' the
privacy of the home in its most basic sense, and it is this which requires that the statute be
subjected to 'strict scrutiny.' " Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. at 548 (Harlan, J., dissenting). While
Justice Harlan felt that "adultery, homosexuality, fornication and incest [were not] immune
from criminal enquiry [sic], however privately practiced," id. at 552, he drew a protective line
around marriage. Id. at 553. This recitation of conduct subject to state regulation did not
include heterosexual sodomy, and it has been suggested that "[t]he logic of the analysis would
• ..apparently protect [such] sexual conduct by married couples." Roe and Paris, supra note
36, at 1181.
74. 381 U.S. at 503 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper,
336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
75. Id. at 502-07 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); see Note, On Privacy, 48
N.Y.U.L. REv. 670, 684 (1973) [hereinafter cited as On Privacy].
76. Id. at 502 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
77. Id. at 510 (Black, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 509-10.
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own notions of 'civilized standards of conduct.' "9 The Constitution, as
Justice Black comprehended it, provided only one method of keeping "in
tune with the times,"80 and that was by constitutional amendment. Justice
Stewart acknowledged that the statute was an "uncommonly silly law," 81
but could not find it offensive to any constitutional provision.12 He also felt
that the due process clause provided only procedural, not substantive,
protection, and that the Connecticut statute violated no procedural right. 83
The majority and concurring opinions in Griswold indicate that there is
a fundamental right to privacy regarding the intimate details of the marriage
relationship, 84 deriving from the earlier protections of the "realm of family
life.' '85 Under the Fourteenth Amendment, this right is secure against all but
a compelling state interest. 86 The cases that have since been decided follow
this theory of privacy rather than the penumbral theory articulated by Justice
Douglas.87 Griswold fails, however, to delineate precisely the nature of this
marital privacy. 88 Despite the observation by Justice Douglas that enforce-
ment of the Connecticut statute would necessarily entail a violation of the
Fourth Amendment, 89 this newly recognized right is far too broad to be
justified solely on the basis of location. 90 Indeed, there are intimations in
Justice Goldberg's concurrence that the protection of the home is, in part, a
protection of the family life centered there.
91
79. Id. at 513 (citations omitted). For a further discussion of "natural law" due process,
see Bertelsman, supra note 63; see also Note, Privacy After Griswold: Constitutional or
Natural Law Right?, 60 Nw. U.L. REV. 813 (1966).
80. 381 U.S. at 522.
81. Id. at 527 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 528.
84. "Despite the philosophical differences of the majority. . . as to which constitutional
provision encompasses the right to privacy, their agreement was complete as to the sanctity of
the marital relationship." Lovisi v. Slayton, 363 F. Supp. 620, 624 (E.D. Va. 1973), aff'd, 539
F.2d 349 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 485 (1976).
85. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
86. See text accompanying notes 42-50 supra.
87. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
88. Even if Griswold is viewed as protecting nothing more than the "intimate medical
problems" of family planning, United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels, 413 U.S. 123, 127 n.4 (1973),
the case may be applicable to the situation in Lovisi. "If, under Griswold, the state cannot
prohibit a husband and wife from using artificial means [of birth control], on what basis can it
prohibit them from using these natural means [e.g., oral copulation]?" BARNETr, supra note 41,
at 53.
89. 381 U.S. at 485-86.
90. "The marital right of privacy has a base broader than the Fourth Amendment alone
and the cases recognizing the right pitch it on grounds that belie that secrecy is a necessary
element." Lovisi v. Slayton, 539 F.2d 349, 354 (4th Cir.) (Winter, J., dissenting), cert. denied,
97 S. Ct. 485 (1976).
91. "Certainly the safeguarding of the home does not follow merely from the sanctity of
property rights. The home derives its pre-eminence as the seat of family life. And the integrity
of that life is so fundamental that it has been found to draw to its protection the principles of
more than one explicitly granted Constitutional right." 381 U.S. at 495 (Goldberg, J., concur-
ring) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 479, 551-52 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
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Griswold may be better understood as a first step toward recognition of
decisional privacy. Although the basis of the decision was the impermissible
means employed by the state, its effect was to protect the couple's decision
to use contraceptives. A necessary ingredient in this decision was the
inclusion of a third person, in this instance a physician, who supplied the
information to effectuate their decision. By protecting the couple, the Court
also extended protection beyond the relationship to a third person.
92
B. Eisenstadt v. Baird
Seven years after Griswold the scope of sexual privacy was further
expanded in Eisenstadt v. Baird.93 Baird, who was not a doctor, was
convicted under a Massachusetts law prohibiting distribution of contracep-
tives to unmarried persons but allowing such access to married persons. 94 At
the conclusion of a lecture on birth control, Baird gave a young woman in
the audience a sample of contraceptive vaginal foam, whereupon he was
arrested for violating the statute. He was granted standing to assert the rights
of unmarried persons in challenging the statute because unhindered distribu-
tion was necessary to effectuate a decision to use contraceptives. 95 The
Court held that the statute's distinction between married and unmarried
persons violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.96
The Court reviewed the possible state objectives that would support
such a distinction and decided that the state had articulated none that were
92. "(A] principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief which
gave it birth." Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910).
93. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
94. Id. at 440-41.
95. The use of contraceptives was not itself unlawful; thus if the Court had not granted
Baird standing to assert the rights of unmarried persons, the latter would have had no forum to
challenge the statute. Id. at 446.
96. "No State shall. . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." U.S. CONST., amend. XIV. The equal protection clause does not mandate that all
persons be treated equally. When the state has the power to regulate, it may treat distinct
classes of persons in different ways. It may not, however, classify individuals in a manner
wholly inconsistent with the objectives of the regulation. Thus, persons similarly situated in the
class must be treated in the same manner. Until recently there have been two fairly rigid levels
of scrutiny employed by the Court when an equal protection challenge is brought. If fundarr en-
tal values are implicated, then a statute is subject to strict scrutiny and must be shown to be
necessary to accomplish a compelling state interest. In addition, there must be no less onerous
method of achieving the same goal. If no fundamental interest is at stake, the statute is
examined much more leniently and will be upheld unless it has no rational connection to any
conceivable legitimate state concern. While the Court in Eisenstadt spoke in terms of this
rational basis test, it actually applied a third, mid-range test, requiring a fair and substantial
relation between the statute and the state's actual objective. See Gunther, Foreword: In Search
of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Modelfora Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L.
REV. i, 17-48 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Gunther]; Note, Developments in the Law-Equal
Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065, 1076-82 (1969). See also San Antonio Independent School
Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-1 10 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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reasonably related to the statute.9 7 The asserted state interest in deterring
premarital sexual relations was dismissed because the statute was ineffective
in achieving that end. Access to contraceptives for the prevention of disease,
as distinguished from contraception, was not regulated, and nothing pre-
vented the distribution and use of contraceptives by married persons who
intended to engage in extramarital sexual activities.98 It was apparent to the
Court that this presented too large an exemption to allow the state to contend
seriously that the statute deterred sexual activity. Moreover, the rationale of
indirectly deterring fornication by regulating access to contraceptives was
found to be "dubious," 99 as the maximum punishment for violating this law
was twenty times that for the actual act of fornication. 100 The Court also
decided that the statute was unrelated to the purpose of protecting public
health. 10 1 The statute regulated distribution of potentially harmful articles,
yet the article in question had not been proven dangerous; 102 thus the statute
was overbroad. Even had such a showing been made, the Court felt that the
statute was unnecessary because federal and state laws already regulated
distribution of dangerous drugs. 103 The state finally attempted to justify the
statute "simply as a prohibition on contraception." 104 While the application
of Griswold to this question was not directly considered, 105 the Court held
that the distinction in the statute between married and unmarried persons
was not rationally related to this asserted moral purpose.106
97. 405 U.S. at 443. "Rather, it merely made what it thought to be the precise accommo-
dation necessary to escape the Griswold ruling." Id. at 450 (quoting Baird v. Eisenstadt, 429
F.2d 1398, 1401 (lst Cir. 1972)).
98. Id. at 442 n.3, 448-49.
99. Id. at 448.
100. An offender convicted of fornication faced a possible ninety day sentence, whereas
distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons was punishable by a five year sentence. Id.
at 449-50.
101. Id. at 450. "[T]he same devices the distribution of which the State purports to regulate
when their asserted purpose is to forestall pregnancy are available without any controls
whatsoever so long as their asserted purpose is to prevent the spread of disease. It is inconceiv-
able that the need for health controls varies with the purpose for which the contraceptive is to
be used when the physical act in all cases is one and the same." Id. at 451 n.8.
102. Id. at 451-52.
103. Id. at 452.
104. Id.
105. "[W]hatever the rights of the individual to access to contraceptives may be, the rights
must be the same for the unmarried and the married alike.
"If under Griswold the distribution of contraceptives to married persons cannot be pro-
hibited, a ban on distribution to unmarried persons would be equally impermissible. ...
"On the other hand, if Griswold is no bar to a prohibition on the distribution of contracep-
tives, the State could not, consistently with the Equal Protection Clause, outlaw distribution to
unmarried but not to married persons. In each case the evil, as perceived by the State, would be
identical, and the underinclusion would be invidious." Id. at 453-54.
"Under-inclusion occurs when a state benefits or burdens persons in a manner that
furthers a legitimate public purpose but does not confer this same benefit or place this same
burden on others who are similarly situated." Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protec-
tion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1084 (1969); see Gunther, supra note 96, at 116-22.
106. 405 U.S. at 447.
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Eisenstadt, then, further strengthened the right of privacy in regard to
procreational decisions by extending its protection to all individuals:
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in
the marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an independ-
ent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of
two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional
makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted govern-
mental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person
as the decision whether to bear or beget a child. 0
7
By thus clarifying the right of decisional privacy originally established in
Griswold, Eisenstadt helped resolve some of the previous uncertainty to
which lower courts had succumbed in their refusal to extend Griswold
beyond its facts. 08 In several of the opinions in Griswold the right was seen
as deriving either from the marriage relationship or the home-as-castle locus
concept of the Fourth Amendment. 0 9 Eisenstadt made it clear that neither
was the case.
It is also evident that in this case Baird, who was not a doctor, was
protected as a function of the woman's right to seek contraceptive informa-
tion because without such protection, the woman would have been unable to
implement her decision to use contraceptives. 110 It is this voluntary sharing
of her privacy that is the crux of the extension of the right, suggesting that
the true limits on this right are consensual in nature. Strict adherence to
technical concepts of "private" and "public" is no longer warranted,
although the relative seclusion that is necessary may vary with the activity
for which the person seeks protection. 1 ' Eisenstadt supports this theory by
107. Id. at 453. Thus, the impact of a decision on the individual making it will influence the
protection given it by the Court. It has been suggested that the Court may have used this
"impact" equal protection analysis as an alternative to extending the right of privacy directly in
order to keep its options open in the abortion decisions that were imminent. See Gunther, supra
note 96, at 122.
108. Tangential issues, such as force, e.g., Towler v. Peyton, 303 F. Supp. 581 (W.D. Va.
1969) (force negating claim of marital privacy in sodomy conviction); Harris v. State, 457 P.2d
638 (Alas. 1969) (force negating privacy protection for sodomy), involvement of minors, e.g.,
People v. Hurd, 5 Cal. App. 3d 865, 85 Cal. Rptr. 718 (1970) (father's sexual activities with his
daughter); State v. Trejo, 83 N.M. 511, 494 P.2d 173 (1972) (sodomy with minor), and less than
absolute privacy, e.g., Wishart v. McDonald, 500 F.2d 1110 (1st Cir. 1974) (conduct in plain
view of neighbors not private); United States v. Brewer, 363 F. Supp. 606 (M.D. Pa. 1973)
(sodomy in prison not in private), prevented lower courts from focusing on the extent and the
individual nature of this decisional right of privacy.
109. See text accompanying notes 59-76 supra.
110. While Griswold arguably may have some overlap with the doctor-patient privilege in
its protection, such an application was impossible in Eisenstadt because Baird was not a doctor.
Thus the decisional privacy of the individual must be clearly recognized. See Roe and Paris,
supra note 36, at 1178-79. See note 88 supra.
11. "Certainly Meyer v. Nebraska, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, and Skinner v. Oklahoma,
the foundations from which the right of marital privacy was developed, had nothing to do with
secrecy. Their outcome depended upon the nature of the activity sought to be regulated and the
relationship of that activity to a protected right." Lovisi v. Slayton, 539 F.2d 349, 354 (4th Cir.)
(Winter, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 485 (1976).
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its protection of intimate decisions made in a setting such as a public
lecture. 112
C. Roe v. Wade
In Roe v. Wade ,113 the Supreme Court expanded the privacy concept
delineated in Griswold to shield decisions between unmarried persons, and
extended protection to third persons necessarily involved in the decision-
making process.
Roe, an unmarried pregnant woman, challenged the abortion laws of
Texas, which prohibited abortions except to save the life of the mother.
114
The Court held that the right of personal privacy under the Fourteenth
Amendment was "broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether
or not to terminate her pregnancy, '" 115 and balanced this interest against the
state's interests in both maternal health and protection of the potential life of
the fetus." 6 The Court concluded that throughout the first trimester of
pregnancy, the woman's fundamental right of privacy was superior to the
state's interest, and the decision was to be left to her and her doctor."
17
During the second trimester, the state's interest in maternal health became
compelling and the abortion was subject to some restriction. 118 In the third
trimester, the state's interest in the potential life was also compelling, and at
this point the state could even prohibit abortions.119
The Court accomplished more than it plainly stated in Roe: it reaffirm-
ed and extended the consensual sharing of the individual's right of privacy
countenanced in Eisenstadt. In protecting the woman's decision to termi-
nate her pregnancy, the Court necessarily conferred derivative protection on
others, such as the hospital support staff, with whom she shared her
privacy.120 Without such additional protection her right would be without
substance, for she would be denied the means to transform her decision into
actuality: the hospital's services could not be provided without fear of
112. 405 U.S. at 440.
113. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
114. Id. at 117-18.
115. Id. at 153.
116. "[T]he State does have an important and legitimate interest in preserving and protect-
ing the health of the pregnant woman,. . and. . . it has still another important and legitimate
interest in protecting the potentiality of human life. These interests are separate and distinct.
Each grows in substantiality as the woman approaches term and, at a point during pregnarcy,
each becomes 'compelling.' " Id. at 162-63 (emphasis in original).
117. Id. at 163. "This means . . . that, for the period of pregnancy prior to this 'compel-
ling' point, the attending physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to determine,
without regulation by the State, that, in his medical judgment, the patient's pregnancy should be
terminated. If that decision is reached, the judgment may be effectuated by an abortion free of
interference by the State." Id.
118. Id. at 164.
119. Id. at 164-65.
120. See text accompanying note 134 infra.
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prosecution. 2t The Court thus expressly recognized the protected right to be
that of decisional privacy.
The Court was not, after all, choosing simply between the alterna-
tives of abortion and continued pregnancy. It was instead choosing
among alternative allocations of decisionmaking authority, for the
issue it faced was whether the woman and her doctor, rather than
an agency of government, should have the authority to make the
abortion decision at various stages of pregnancy. . . Despite
what the Court's opinion seemed to say, the result it reached was
not the simple "substitution of one non-rational judgment for
another concerning the relative importance of a mother's opportu-
nity to live the life she has planned and a fetus's opportunity to live
at all," but was instead a decision about who should make judg-
ments of that sort.
122
The necessity for strict seclusion implied in Griswold, if not fading, at
least now varies with the circumstances. 123 In Roe numerous persons were
encompassed by the woman's right of privacy. The right was exercised in a
hospital, which is a relatively public place in comparison with the home. 
24
A requirement of strict seclusion would preclude recognition of the right,
yet the Court in Roe upheld the woman's right to decisional privacy because
the activity, while not isolated, remained secluded as against the public. Her
actions were only public among those with whom she shared her privacy. 125
To all others, these actions remained private. 126
Although both Eisenstadt and Roe involved unmarried women, the
Court did not consider whether the state could validly punish the underlying
illicit sexual relationship. 127 Yet these cases allowed the individuals involv-
ed in nonmarital heterosexual relationships to take contraceptive precautions
and obtain abortions. ' 28 While perhaps not indicating approval of the under-
121. 410 U.S. at 117-18 n.1, 165-66.
122. Tribe, Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87
HARV. L. REv. 1, 11 (1973) (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
123. See text accompanying note IlI supra.
124. See note 134 infra.
125. "Nor is an abortion a 'public matter': only the participants in the operation are
present." Wheeler & Kovar, supra note 11, at 547.
126. "The desire for privacy is nearly always partial. There is a desire to be simultaneously
in private and in 'public' in relations with particular other persons." Shils, Privacy: Its Constitu-
tion and Vicissitudes, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 281, 304-05 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
Shils]; see Katz, A Postscriptum, supra note 30.
127. In Roe the Court dismissed almost out of hand such an indirect motive: "It has been
argued occasionally that these laws were the product of a Victorian social concern to discour-
age illicit sexual conduct .... [I]t appears that no court or commentator has taken the
argument seriously." 410 U.S. at 148. In Eisenstadt the Court was less blunt, but the effect was
the same: "[D]eterring fornication . . . cannot reasonably be taken as the purpose of the ban
on distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons." 405 U.S. at 450.
128. See note 134 infra. "The Court did not speak in terms of relationships, but its language
indicates that, if a relationship is a prerequisite, the relationship of marriage is not. It would
seem that any heterosexual relationship would suffice to rationalize Eisenstadt in terms of a
relationship analysis, because the Court had no information concerning the permanence of the
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lying illicit activity, these cases clearly establish that the state's interest in
indirectly regulating such sexual activity is subordinate to the individual
right of decisional privacy.
129
D. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton
Further refinement of this quasi-public distinction came in Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton,130 in which respondents sought to enjoin two Atlanta
movie theaters from showing allegedly obscene films. The Supreme Court
found no fundamental personal liberty implicated in viewing such movies in
a place of public accommodation; while reaffirming the protection of the
home articulated in Stanley v. Georgia,131 the Court refused to extend it.
"[I]t is unavailing to compare a theater open to the public for a fee with the
private home of Stanley." 132 The quasi-public surroundings of the theater,
coupled with a' profit motive, negated any privacy interest that might
otherwise attach.
133
Initially, Paris seems to imply that in order to be protected, activities
must still be in the privacy of the home. This inference is dispelled by the
Court's distinction between the broad protection given decisional privacy
and the limited protection given obscenity:
The protection afforded [obscenity] by Stanley v. Georgia is re-
stricted to a place, the home. In contrast, the constitutionally
protected [decisional] privacy of family, marriage, motherhood,
procreation, and child rearing is not just concerned with a particu-
lar place, but with a protected intimate relationship. Such protected
privacy extends to the doctor's office, the hospital, the hotel room,
or as otherwise required to safeguard the right to intimacy involved.
Obviously, there is no necessary or legitimate expectation of priva-
cy which would extend to marital intercourse on a street corner or a
theater stage. 34
sexual relationships of the women who were given the contraceptives ... Any continuing
relationship between them . . .was not only lacking the supportive legal framework of
marriage, but also in some states would itself involve the crime of fornication." Roe and Paris,
supra note 36, at 1177.
129. "The lack of discussion in Roe of morality and offensiveness may signal the Court's
implicit assumption that the enforcement of morality cannot justify the infringement of a
fundamental right such as privacy." Roe and Paris, supra note 36, at 1172.
"The growing protection of non-procreational activity between consenting adults reflects
the changing sexual mores of society. The early basis of the right in the ancient institution of
marriage soon lost its relevance and applicability in the late 1960's and early 1970's. Eisenstadt
represented not so much a shocking expansion of the ill-defined right of privacy as a recognition
by the Court, in the guise of equal protection language, that it could no longer enforce an
outdated morality." Note, The Constitutional Right of Privacy: An Examination, 69 Nw. U.L.
REV. 263, 268 (1974).
130. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
131. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
132. 413 U.S. at 65-66.
133. Id. at 68. See note 137 infra.
134. Id. at 66 n. 13 (emphasis added). This passage, in reinterpreting Roe, makes clear that
the right of privacy is decisional in character and capable of extension to others. See text
accompanying notes 113-29 supra.
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The Court thus recognized the necessity for decisional privacy to be vari-
able, and reaffirmed its application, depending on the circumstances, even
in quasi-public places.135 The Court added a caveat, however, that if there
were commercial exploitation of the intimate activity, no protection would
attach.' 36 This is consistent with the right of decisional privacy, for in such
circumstances the intent of the parties is public dissemination. 137 Converse-
ly, when the person's expectation is seclusion from the public, the activity is
protected.' 38
E. Summary
The concept of decisional privacy has been evolving slowly to meet the
needs of society to protect the individual from governmental intrusion into
areas of intimate concern. 139 This right of decisional privacy can be seen as
the right to control the extent of dissemination of otherwise secret informa-
tion about oneself. 140 When such information is shared, although no longer
technically secret, there is no intention to share the knowledge on a wider
scale.' The information is still private as against the rest of the world. So,
too, may acts be shared. It is this control over the consensual act of sharing
that is at the root of decisional privacy. Without such control, it would not
be possible to maintain the integrity of one's character. 142 To preserve this
135. This also undercuts the necessity for strict seclusion that the court of appeals felt was
decisive in Lovisi v. Slayton, 549 F.2d 349 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 485 (1976). See
notes 194-209 and accompanying text infra.
136. 413 U.S. at 65.
137. See text accompanying notes 29-32 supra. See, e.g., Raphael v. Hogan, 305 F. Supp.
749 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (sodomy in theatrical play not protected); People v. Parker, 33 Cal. App.
3d 842, 109 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1973) (filming oral copulation with intent commercially to market
film negates privacy expectation); People v. Drolet, 30 Cal. App. 3d 207, 105 Cal. Rptr. 824
(1973) (performing oral copulation for paying public negates expectation of privacy).
138. See text accompanying notes 124-26 supra.
139. One commentator has suggested that this right may also be called "personhood."
"The theme of personhood is. . .emerging. It has been groping. . . for a rubric. Sometimes it
is called privacy, inaptly it would seem . .. ; autonomy perhaps, though that seems too
dangerously broad. But the idea is that of personhood in the sense of those attributes of an
individual which are irreducible in his selfhood. We all know the agonizing judgments that have
had to be made and that will have to be made in such diverse areas as abortion and the death
penalty, which it seems to me are aspects of this issue of personhood." Freund, Remarks at the
Annual Dinner of the American Law Institute, 52 ALl PROCEEDINGS 574-75 (1975-76); see
Marshall, The Right to Privacy: A Skeptical View, 21 MCGILL L.J. 242 (1975).
140. See generally Wheeler & Kovar, supra note 11, at 539-40.
141. See Shils, supra note 126. "That which is solitarily private is often impelled outward
into a community of two persons; that which is personally private between two persons is often
impelled outward into a sharing between one of the two and a third person, and so it goes-but
nearly always with the intention that it should not pass beyond that third or nth sharer.
Voluntary self-disclosure is not usually intended to be boundless. The disclosure does not
entirely annihilate the boundedness characteristic of privacy." Id. at 304-05.
142. See Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475,477-78 (1968): "It is my thesis that privacy is not
just one possible means among others to insure some other value, but that it is necessarily
related to ends and relations of the most fundamental sort: respect, love, friendship and trust.
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vital fundamental interest, case law has generated a zone of presumptive
immunity from governmental regulation for non-public conduct: 143 "outside
areas of plainly harmful conduct, every American is left to shape his own
life as he thinks best . ... "144
Decisional privacy with respect to the private sexual activity of con-
senting adults should be within this protection. The state's asserted right to
regulate sexual behavior derives from its general police power in regard to
morality. 145 In the past, mere recitation of this incantation has been enough
to foreclose further judicial examination of the matter. The privacy cases,
146
however, in protecting access to contraceptives and abortion as a fundamen-
tal right, imply protection of the underlying decision regarding sexual
behavior as well. Thus, when state regulation impinges on an individual's
choice of sexual activity, a deeper inquiry must be undertaken. Eisenstadt
and Roe intimated that the state's generalized interest in morality is insuffi-
cient to be considered compelling. 147 The state's interest, then, must be
Privacy is not merely a good technique for furthering these fundamental relations; rather
without privacy they are simply inconceivable. They require a context of privacy or the
possibility of privacy for their existence. To make clear the necessity of privacy as a context for
respect, love, friendship and trust is to bring out also why a threat to privacy seems to threaten
our very integrity as persons. To respect, love, trust, feel affection for others and to regard
ourselves as the objects of love, trust and affection is at the heart of our notion of ourselves as
persons among persons, and privacy is the necessary atmosphere for these attitudes and action,
as oxygen is for combustion." See also Note, From Private Places to Personal Privacy: A Post-
Katz Study of Fourth Amendment Protection, 43 N.Y.U.L. REV. 968, 978 (1968).
143. See Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1425-26 (1974).
"Hence, the real significance of the composite approach of Griswold and the recent abortion
decisions is their establishment of the presumption that individual privacy is so vital and
fundamental a right that government must be amply prepared to justify any intrusions upon it."
Clark, Constitutional Sources of the Penumbral Right to Privacy, 19 VILL. L. REV. 833, 883-84
(1974).
144. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 213 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring in both Doe and Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)) (challenging Georgia's abortion laws) (quoting Kent v. Dulles,
357 U.S. 116, 126 (1958)). Justice Douglas saw this right as protecting "freedom of choice in
basic decisions of one's life .... " 410 U.S. at 211.
145. See, e.g., Note, The Right to Decide-Individual Liberty Versus State Police Powers,
18 ARIz. L. REV. 207, 208-20 (1976); Note, The Constitutionality of Sodomy Statutes, 45
FORDHAM L. REV. 553, 579-85 (1976); Roe and Paris, supra note 36, at 1166-73.
146. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
147. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,447-
54 (1972); cf. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57-69 (1973) (exhibition of obscene
movies regulatable); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 n.8, 566-68 (1968) (private posses-
sion of obscenity permissible); Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 688-90
(1959) (denial of license to exhibit "immoral" movie); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485
(1957) (mailing of obscene pictures not protected); id. at 501-02 (Harlan, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part); Moreno v. United States, 345 F. Supp. 310, 314 (D.D.C. 1972), affl'd, 413
U.S. 528 (1973) (arbitrary classification of household regarding eligibility for foodstamps); In re
Labady, 326 F. Supp. 924, 926-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (private homosexual conduct no bar to
naturalization); Mindel v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 312 F. Supp. 485, 487 (N.D. Cal.
1970) (private sexual conduct unrelated to job performance not grounds for dismissal). See
notes 129 & 145 supra.
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more than merely the police power to govern morality if it is to rise to the
level of a compelling interest necessary to overcome this right of decisional
privacy. 1
48
That the same right of decisional privacy exists when one or both of the
original participants includes a third party was demonstrated in Griswold,
Eisenstadt, and Roe. The factual situation in each of these cases indicated
that protection was given to individuals involved in intimate associations
who chose to include two, or even more, persons in order to effectuate their
intimate decisions. In all these cases, the additional parties were brought
within the derivative privacy of the original decisionmaker. Griswold pre-
sented the marital association of two individuals who shared their private
contraceptive decision with their doctor; the initial decision to seek con-
traceptive information protected the doctor as well. 149 In Eisenstadt the right
of an unmarried individual to obtain contraceptives was asserted. The
person who helped realize her decision in this instance was not a doctor. 50
Roe further extended protection under this right to as many persons as were
necessary to effectuate a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy.' 51
The realm of privacy thus enlarged by these cases was valid as against those
to whom the privacy had not been extended, including the state. 5 2
It is apparent that under this theory of decisional privacy whether an
intimate decision and its effectuation will be protected cannot depend on the
number of persons involved. 153 Since under Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe
the state cannot exclude a third person from protection, neither can it
logically exclude a fourth person 154 nor, absent a compelling state interest,
can any numerical line be drawn. Of course, numbers must make a differ-
ence at some point because there will be too many persons involved to avoid
148. "Roe and Paris suggest that in the absence of a fundamental privacy right or another
fundamental constitutional guarantee, the Court will give the states very broad and virtually
unreviewed discretion to legislate on the basis of rather nebulous and nonempirical interests
such as the regulation of morality. However, when a fundamental right to privacy exists, there
is reason to believe that its infringement cannot be justified by those same interests." Roe and
Paris, supra note 36, at 1167. See notes 129 &-145 and accompanying text supra. Paris does not
lessen the state's burden under this analysis because unlike decisional privacy, which draws its
protection from a variety of sources, the only protection obscenity can claim from that case
derives solely from the sanctity of the home.
149. See notes 54-58 and accompanying text supra.
150. Implicitly involved in her decision was a third person, her present or potential lover.
See notes 128-29 supra.
151. See text accompanying notes 123-29 supra.
152. "Privacy may be the privacy of a single individual, it may be the privacy of two
individuals, or it may be the privacy of three or numerous individuals. But it is always the
privacy of these persons, single or plural, vis-h-vis other persons." Shils, supra note 126, at
281.
153. See note 134 and accompanying text supra; see note 156 infra.
154. See text accompanying note 134 supra.
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rendering the act public, but the boundaries short of excessive numbers must
be formed by the individual's choice.1
55
The evolution of the case law to date thus indicates that as long as the
acts are secluded from the public, are consensual, and are not for profit, the
concept of decisional privacy should prevail. Absent a compelling state
interest, this would leave to the individual, rather than the government, the
right to fix the limits of his privacy. 156 Specifically, individual decisions
regarding unusual sexual preferences such as sodomy should be beyond
state regulation as a matter of decisional privacy. 157 Several states are in
apparent agreement, having legislatively revised their sodomy statutes to
place the private consensual sexual activities of adults beyond state regula-
tion. 158 Virginia's sodomy statute has not been so revised, and it was upheld
155. "This approach does not unqualifiedly sanction personal whim. If the activity in
question involves more than one participant, as in the instant case, each must be capable of
consenting, and each must in fact consent to the conduct for the right of privacy to attach."
Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1204 (E.D. Va. 1975) (Mehrige, J.,
dissenting), aff'd mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976). Moreover, Eisenstadt and Roe suggest this
number may be quite large. See text accompanying notes 112 & 134 supra.
156. "We believe that the most important factor to be considered is whether the challenged
conduct is public or private in nature. If it is public or if it involves a large number of other
persons, it may pose a threat to the community. If, on the other hand, it is entirely private, the
likelihood of harm to others is minimal and any effort to regulate or penalize the conduct may
lead to an unjustified invasion of the individual's constitutional rights. For instance, it is now
established that official inquiry into a person's private sexual habits does violence to his
constitutionally protected zone of privacy." In re Labady, 326 F. Supp. 924, 927 (S.D.N.Y.
1971).
157. Some state courts that recently reviewed their sodomy statutes have indicated at least
by way of dictum that this theory of decisional privacy is correct as a matter of constitutional
law. See, e.g., State v. Callaway, 25 Ariz. App. 267, 542 P.2d 1147 (1975), rev'd sub nom. State
v. Bateman, 113 Ariz. 107, 547 P.2d 6 (1976); State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348 (Iowa 1976) (only
as to heterosexual conduct); State v. Elliot, 88 N.M. 187, 539 P.2d 207 (Ct. App. 1975), rev'd, 89
N.M. 305, 551 P.2d 1352 (1976); People v. Rice, 80 Misc. 2d 511, 363 N.Y.S.2d 484 (Suffolk
County Dist. Ct. 1975), rev'dpercuriam, 87 Misc. 2d 257, 383 N.Y.S.2d 799 (App. Term 1976).
Curiously, when the examination of sodomy statutes is indirect, as when the state is
seeking civil sanctions relating to employment, some courts appear to be more receptive to
privacy arguments asserted by individuals. Unless there is a demonstrable effect on job
performance, the state is precluded from indirectly regulating the private sexual conduct of its
employees. See, e.g., Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Acanfora v. Board of
Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843 (D. Md. 1973), aff'd on other grounds, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974); Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., 1 Cal. 3d 214,416 P.2d 375, 82 Cal.
Rptr. 175 (1969); On Privacy, supra note 75, at 726-32; 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 263, 268-72 (1974).
158. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 286, 288a (West Supp. 1977); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-
3-401, -404, -409 (Supp. 1975); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-65, -70, -71, -72a, -72b, -73a
(West Supp. 1976); DEL. CODE tit. 11, §§ 765, 766, 772, 773 (Supp. 1976); HAW. REV. STAT. §
768-71 (1968), repealed by 1972 Haw. Sess. Laws, act 9; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-2 (1972)
(1961 Laws, p. 1983 §§ 11-2, -3, -4, -5, -9 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977) (P.A. 77-2638 § 1 (1973));
IND. CODE §§ 35-41-1-2, -42-4-2 (Supp. 1976); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, §§ 251-55 (1976
Pamph.); MINN. STAT. § 617.14 (1964), repealed by 1967 Minn. Laws, ch. 507, § 12; N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 40-A-9-20 to -23 (Supp. 1975); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-20-01 to -07 (Special Supp.
1975); OHlo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2907.03, .04, .06, .07, .09 (Page 1975), §§ 2907.01, .05 (Page
Supp. 1977); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 163.305, .325, .335, .385, .395, .405, .415, .425, .435, .445, .455,
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in Lovisi v. Slayton, 15 a case in which the concept of decisional privacy
was recognized but not applied.
III. Lovisi v. Slayton
A. A Factual Summary
Although married, the petitioners in Lovisi did not confine their sexual
activities to each other; they indulged in "swinging" -the consensual
welcoming of additional adult partners to a marital sexual relationship. The
Lovisis placed an advertisement in a magazine catering to "swingers."
' 160
Through this medium they made contact with a man of similar sexual
preferences. They engaged in tripartite sexual activities in the privacy of the
Lovisis' bedroom. 161 These activities were commemorated with the aid of a
Polaroid camera. 162 The trial was precipitated when the wife's daughters
were caught with an allegedly obscene photograph they had taken to
school. 163 The photograph allegedly depicted one of the girls seated on a
sofa next to an adult male; both were nude. 164 The teacher who confiscated
the picture tore it up and flushed it down a toilet, so its contents were never
proved in court. 165 Two days later, the mother was called to a hearing at
school with the principal, a welfare department representative, the police,
and her daughters. 166 One of the girls told the police there were similar
photographs at home. 167 The mother then left the meeting and the police
secured a search warrant. 168 Although the Lovisis later claimed without
.465 (1975); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 22-22-21, repealedby 1976 S.D. Sess. Laws, ch. 158,
§ 22-8; WASH. REV CODE §§ 9.79.140, .170, .180, .190, .200, .210, .220 (Supp. 1975); W. VA.
CODE §§ 61-8B-1 to -13 (1977); cf. ALA. CONsT. art. I, § 22 (right of privacy); CAL. CONST. art. I,
§ I (privacy affirmatively protected as a matter of state constitutional law); HAWAII CONST. art.
1, § 5 (protection similar to that provided by Fourth Amendment from invasions of privacy).
159. 363 F. Supp. 620 (E.D. Va. 1973), aff'd, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct.
485 (1976).
160. 363 F. Supp. at 622.
161. Id.
162. Id. A question arose at trial and on appeal about who operated the camera. The
prosecution contended that the wife's daughters had been present in the room and had taken the
pictures. The defense strongly urged that the daughters were not present and that the pictures
were taken by means of an automatic timing device on the camera. The question was never
resolved at trial. Id.
163. Carolyn Acree, aged 11 at the time in question, and Eugenia Acree, aged 13 at that
time, were Margaret Lovisi's children by a former marriage. Id.
164. Id. at 623.
165. Brief for Appellants at 4, Lovisi v. Slayton, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S.
Ct. 485 (1976).
166. 363 F. Supp. at 623.
167. Id.
168. Brief for Appellants at 5, Lovisi v. Slayton, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S.
Ct. 485 (1976).
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contradiction that the pictures of their sexual activities were kept in a box in
a locked gun cabinet, 169 one of the arresting officers testified that there were
other unrelated pictures of an obscene nature throughout the house. 170
At trial, the third party participant, a native of the West Indies, testified
for the prosecution.171 As a result of his allegedly criminal involvement he
was deported. 172 His testimony indicated that the fellatio had taken place but
that the pictures had been taken by means of the automatic-timing feature on
the camera. 173
B. The Federal District Court
The district court reviewed the Lovisis' habeas corpus petition for their
conyictions of sodomy with each other in the presence of a third person
174
and found that the right of privacy protected the sexual intimacies of
husband and wife. 175 The court observed that the Virginia statute, which
purported to reach all sodomistic conduct regardless of where and with
whom it takes place, regulated "no less than the actual form of sexual
expression between husband and wife." 176 The statute allowed "approved"
conduct while making criminal whatever conduct the state considered "un-
acceptable." The court found such a distinction to be an unbridled attempt
to interfere with the intimate details of the marriage. Under the constitution-
al principles enunciated in the earlier privacy cases, the court held that the
statute could not be applied to the private consensual sexual activities of
husband and wife. 177 Yet the court perceived that something more than mere
marriage vows made the activity worthy of protection. Rather, it is "the
nature of sexuality itself or something intensely private to the individual
which calls forth constitutional protection." 78 In light of Eisenstadt the
court doubted whether there was any basis whatsoever for applying the
statute to the private sodomous activities of consenting unmarried heterosex-
ual adults.
169. 363 F. Supp. at 627 n.4.
170. Id. at 623. Regardless of the nature of the pictures found within the house, their
possession was not charged. In any event, they should come within the protection afforded the
home by Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). See notes 33-41 and accompanying text
supra. The only pictures of the Lovisis' sexual activities came from the locked gun cabinet. 363
F. Supp. at 623. See text accompanying note 169 supra,
171. Brief for Appellants at 30, Lovisi v. Slayton, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S.
Ct. 485 (1976).
172. 539 F.2d at 350 n.2.
173. 363 F. Supp. at 622.
174. Id. at 621.
175. Id. at 624.
176. 363 F. Supp. at 625. See note 3 supra. It may be that the dictum in the court of appeals
opinion in Lovisi has already limited application of the Virginia statute to other than married
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Seeing beyond the factual diversion of the third person's presence, the
court determined that the right of privacy was individual, not relational in
nature, and that it could perhaps encompass all three persons' actions.
179
Prerequisite to such protection, however, was the physical seclusion of the
activity.180 In addition, because the acts were photographed the court re-
quired, as a necessary element of this protection, the permanent and abso-
lute seclusion of these photographs. 1 ' Because the Lovisis failed to provide
complete protection of the photographs subsequent to the activities depicted
therein, the court held that they had retroactively waived their rght to
privacy regarding the acts.'
82
The court's reliance on a theory of waiver seems misplaced because it
amounts to the application of a standard of strict liability. In the criminal
context, waiver is treated as a variable concept, differing in its requirements
depending upon the values at stake. Under the Fourth Amendment guarantee
against unreasonable search and seizure, consent to a search is regarded as
acceptance of any constitutional infirmities in the search.183 Voluntariness
of the consent is, therefore, quite important. The district court in Lovisi
relied on Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,184 which held that the voluntariness of
consent by one not in custody was to be determined by all of the circum-
stances. 185 The person's knowledge of a right to refuse'consent was relevant
but not conclusive on the question of the validity of the consent.186 When the
constitutional guarantees of a fair criminal trial are at issue, there is a stricter
definition of waiver.187 The state must show that there was "an intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege."
18 8
Neither sense of waiver was truly applicable to the facts of Lovisi. The
fundamental nature of the right of privacy inherent in the person and the
home indicates that it is entitled to substantial protection. " '[C]ourts in-
dulge every reasonable presumption against waiver' . . . and . . . do not
presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights." 1 9 The right of
privacy therefore seems more closely aligned to the criminal procedural
179. Id. at 624-25.
180. Id. at 626.
181. Id. at 626-27. "By electing to photograph their sexual relations, thus creating the
possibility that the intimacy of their acts would be destroyed by future viewing by others, the
Lovisis took upon themselves an especially heavy burden to protect their privacy. They did not
meet that burden, the Court concludes, because of their failure to deny other persons access to
the photographs." Id. at 627.
182. Id.
183. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973).
184. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
185. Id. at 248-49.
186. Id.
187. See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353 (1963); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956);
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
188. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
189. Id.
Summer 1977]
guarantees than to the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure,
assuming it could be classed with either. Even if waiver by consent were a
properly applicable concept, the Lovisis' conduct should have had to
amount to a knowing, intelligent waiver of their fundamental right of
decisional privacy for the court's rationale to apply. At most, their conduct
amounts to negligence; this should be insufficient to trigger the court's
theory of waiver.
Waiver, however, is not a proper concept to use when the right of
privacy is involved. Privacy cannot by its nature be relinquished retroactive-
ly. The right is either applicable or inapposite. If the facts of a particular
situation show that the actions were "public," the claim to a right of privacy
does not arise. Conversely, if the facts show the right does exist, its
presumptive immunity from regulation attaches and is not waived by subse-
quent conduct. The right of privacy is then overcome only by a compelling
state interest. There is no middle ground onto which the waiver concept can
be imposed.
Even assuming that the concept of waiver is appropriate, the facts in
Lovisi do not support such a finding. The evidence did not show that the
"girls were actually in possession of the photographs depicting the acts here
prosecuted." 190 Yet because the girls somehow acquired an unrelated "sex-
ually oriented photograph,' 191 later confiscated at school, the court con-
cluded that the parents had abandoned the privacy surrounding their consen-
sual sexual activities.192 Finally, the court stated that the girls were aware of
the activities at issue, 193 but left unanswered the question of whether the
girls acquired that knowledge by accident or by design. The flaw in the
court's logic is that its allegations of negligence on the Lovisis' part were
not tied to their conduct. The most the state could show was that the Lovisis
consensually shared their privacy with a third person, who was necessary to
the satisfaction of their sexual preferences. There was no intention to share
that privacy with others, especially not with the state. Thus, vis-h-vis the
state, the activity remained private.
Although the district court correctly assessed the requirements of the
right of decisional privacy in the abstract, it went astray in applying the
190. 363 F. Supp. at 627.
191. Id.
192. Id. "While the evidence does not reveal that the Acree girls were actually in posses-
sion of the photographs depicting the acts here prosecuted, it is clear that they had possession
of another sexually oriented photograph. This suggests that snapshots taken by the Lovisis
were not kept at home in such a way that the children would be denied access to them." Id. The
court indicated that it was equally plausible that the girls acquired the pictures through no fault
of the Lovisis: "The girls' testimony was further impeached by the admission of Carolyn Acree
that she would like to see the relationship of her mother and her stepfather broken apart and
that she would like for her mother and stepfather to go to prison so that she, Carolyn, and her
sister might be returned to their natural father." Id. at 626 n.3 (citation omitted).
193. Id. at 627 n.4. See generally Supplemental Appendix for Appellants, Lovisi v. Slayton,
539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 485 (1976).
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 4
theory to the facts of the case. This resulted in an improper holding based on
alleged but unproven subsequent negligence. Under the facts as proven,
there was a good-faith attempt to restrict access to any pictures of the
Lovisis' activities. Because this negated an intent to share their privacy with
their daughters, the Lovisis' privacy was preserved.
C. The Court of Appeals
The court of appeals acknowledged that the right of privacy applied to
the private consensual sexual activities of husband and wife: "What they do
in the privacy of the marital boudoir is beyond the power of the state to
scrutinize." 194 The court held, however, that the presence of a third person
in their bedroom dissolved this protection of privacy by making their actions
completely "in public" and consequently subject to regulation by the
state.
195
In contrast to the district court's reasoning, the court of appeals indi-
cated that the expectation of marital privacy would not be negated by the
later "recounting in explicit detail [of] their own intimacies and tech-
niques." 196 While the court did not expressly extend this protection to
explicit, but not obscene, photographs of sexual activity, the logic of the
court's rationale indicates that such protection should be extended. The
taking of such pictures can be seen as one of the details of marriage insulated
from state regulation by Griswold; 197 thus the privacy of the activity is not
destroyed by the fact that pictures are taken. Subsequent regulation of the
private sexual activity on the basis of who might or did see these photo-
graphs is untenable because the First Amendment protects oral and written
non-obscene descriptions of such activity; 198 protection probably would
have been available even had the pictures been obscene. 199 The locational
protection afforded by Stanley v. Georgia2" to mere private possession of
obscenity in the home seems to apply squarely." 1 There may well be a
corollary protection available under the rationale of Stanley that would
protect the production of obscenity in the home for private viewing. 20 2 The
194. 539 F.2d at 351; see BARNr, supra note 41, at 29.
195. Id. See text accompanying note 134 supra; see note 156 supra.
196. 539 F.2d at 351.
197. See text accompanying note 73 supra.
198. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-03 (1952) (motion pictures
protected by First Amendment).
199., Neither court made an express determination that the pictures were obscene. The
district court indicated that some pictures found in the house were "of an obscene nature," 363
F. Supp. at 623, but did not include in that characterization the pictures of the Lovisis' conduct.
Id. The court of appeals merely termed the pictures "erotic." 539 F.2d at 350.
200. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
201. See notes 33-41 and accompanying text supra.
202. "[P]erhaps in the future [Stanley] will be recognized as good law only when a man
writes salacious books in his attic, prints them in his basement, and reads them in his living
room." United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 382 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). See notes 33-41 and accompanying text supra.
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most likely argument that the state might offer in rebuttal is that it has a
compelling interest in protecting children from exposure to such mate-
rials. 20 3 Had such exposure been shown and obscenity proven, the Lovisis
might have been charged with crimes relating to the corruption of minors, or
possibly producing obscenity, but even this would not permit prosecution of
the underlying conduct because the Lovisis had maintained their expectation
of privacy.
The difference in the approach of the two courts is partially explained
by the court of appeals' over-reliance on the Griswold inference of a
marriage relation as a prerequisite to protection under the right of decisional
privacy. 20 4 Since Griswold the Court has greatly extended protection of
privacy beyond the marital relation. Eisenstadt v. Baird"5 stated that the
right of privacy was individual in nature and that marriage was but "an
association of two individuals." 20 6 Roe v. Wade207 also protected the
privacy of an individual. Even the wording of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the source of protection for privacy against state interference, focuses on the
person, not on a relationship. 20 8 Finally, one of the cases relied on in
Griswold indicates that even the right to marry is an individual right. 2° Yet
203. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 63443 (1968) (different standard of obscenity
for children).
204. This over-reliance on the marriage relationship also seems to have been present in Doe
v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd mem., 425 U.S. 901
(1976). Two homosexuals brought a declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionali-
ty of Virginia's sodomy statute as violative of their right to sexual privacy. The three judge
court found that the right of privacy derived solely from Griswold's protection of family life,
the sanctity of the home, and the incidents of marriage. Id. at 1200-01. Relying strongly on
Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961), a precursor to Griswold, the
court concluded that homosexual conduct met none of the Griswold criteria it found requisite to
protection under the right of privacy. Id. at 1201-02. Consequently, the state's rational basis in
regulating morality was sufficient to sustain the statue's criminalization of private consensual
homosexual conduct against this privacy challenge. Id. The dissent, by tracing the constitution-
al evolution of the right to privacy since Griswold, noted that the right is now individual in
nature rather than dependent on marriage for its existence. Id. at 1204. The dissent concluded:
"A mature individual's choice of an adult sexual partner, in the privacy of his or her own home,
would appear to me to be a decision of the utmost private and intimate concern." Id. at 1203.
The Supreme Court's summary affirmance indicates that it is not yet willing to find
homosexual activity entitled to protection as part of the fundamental right of privacy. The
Court's caution in this regard is not surprising, inasmuch as it has yet to delineate affirmatively
the protected boundaries of intimate heterosexual conduct. Whether there is some constitution-
al distinction between heterosexual and homosexual sodomy will remain uncertain until the
Court speaks further. See generally Comment, Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney: Closing the
Door to a Fundamental Right of Sexual Privacy, 53 DEN. L.J. 553 (1976); Note, The Constitu-
tionality of Sodomy Statutes, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 553 (1976).
205. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
206. Id. at 453. See note 107 and accompanying text supra.
207, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See text accompanying note 118 supra.
208. See note 42 supra.
209. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). Even earlier the Court had reaffirmed
the general common law's right of privacy: "No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully
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the court of appeals apparently overlooked these factors in its narrow
characterization of privacy as relational rather than individual in nature. If
the court had properly applied the developments in the law since Griswold,
it would not have found decisive the mechanical distinction that two persons
are "in private" while three are not.
210
In Griswold, Justice Douglas noted that the marriage relation was a
bilateral loyalty. 211 No violence is done to that loyalty when additional
persons are welcomed into the activities of the marital relationship. The
couple's expectation of privacy remains, and their conduct evinces an intent
to extend their privacy only to a private person-not to the state. While
perhaps no longer technically bilateral, the loyalty is maintained; the con-
sensual activities are still "sacred" as against state intrusion.
The dissent in the Lovisi appellate decision, starting with the majori-
ty's premise that married couples were protected from criminal inquiry into
their private consensual activities, reasoned that "secrecy is not a necessary
element of the right and that therefore the right exists, whether or not
exercised in secret. . . What would not be punishable sodomy in [a third
person's] absence is not rendered punishable sodomy by his presence
" -212 Moreover, the dissent argued, under the test articulated by the
majority, while a married couple who subsequently talked or wrote of their
marital sexual activities was protected from prosecution, a couple forced by
economic conditions to share housing, and to that extent losing the superfi-
cial privacy required by the majority, would be subject to prosecution even
though there was no subsequent dissemination. 21 3 The dissent also felt that a
married couple's use of sexual surrogates as part of an attempt to salvage a
sexually maladjusted marriage would violate the majority's test for protec-
tion of privacy. 214 "Surely these absurd results suggest that the presence of
[a third person] is irrelevant. "215 The dissent concluded that "certainly
within the marital relation, and perhaps in some instances even without, the
nature and kind of consensual sexual intimacy is beyond the power of the
state to regulate or even to inquire.' '216 Thus, although the dissent did not
have occasion on these facts to extend expressly to a third person the right of
privacy as an individual right, the dissenters indicated that at a minimum
protection was available as a function of the married couple's privacy.
guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of
his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others." Union Pacific Ry. v.
Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (dictum).
210."The presence of the onlooker . . . in [their] bedroom dissolved the reasonable
expectation of privacy . 539 F.2d at 351.
211. 381 U.S. at 486.
212. 539 F.2d at 354-55 (Winter, J., dissenting).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 355.
216. Id. at 354.
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The Supreme Court's denial of certiorari 217 in this case left unanswered
the question of whether the right of decisional privacy is individual or
remains relational. The logical progression of the cases indicates that the
right should be treated as individual in character. All that remains is for the
Court to affirm this evolution of the right as a matter of positive law.
Conclusion
Whatever the source of the right to decisional privacy, the Supreme
Court has recognized its existence. Yet the Court has not delineated the
boundaries of that right. Explicit protection has been given to effectuating
decisions regarding sexual activities; sexual privacy, at least within mar-
riage, has been viewed as fundamental. The Court has also given some
protection to the sexually-related decisions of unmarried heterosexual
adults. The Court has yet, however, to pass squarely on whether the right of
privacy in sexual decisions protects marital sodomy.
The cases reviewed in this note indicate that highly structured distinc-
tions between protected and unprotected activity should give way to a more
flexible orientation on the part of the courts. Judges should deal more
forthrightly with the question of whether there is a reasonable expectation of
privacy. The answer in each case will depend partially on the nature and
location of the consensual activity, on the numbers of individuals involved,
and on whether there is a commercial intent. By adopting a standard of
seclusion as against the public, the courts could allow the state to regulate its
proper concern, the public manifestations of sexual conduct, while protect-
ing those who prefer unconventional methods of private sexual fulfillment.
The right of decisional privacy regarding sexual activity then devolves
to the right of an individual to make and to effectuate decisions regarding
intimate areas of one's life. If there is actual consent and the activities are
secluded vis-a-vis the public, a presumptive immunity from governmental
regulation attaches. This immunity can be overcome only by a compelling
state interest. The police power interest in morality is not compelling, and
thus is insufficient to overcome this presumption. Therefore, despite state
sodomy statutes, the right of sexual decisional privacy, as a matter of
constitutional law, should protect the participants' preferences as long as
force is not employed nor minors involved. Simply put, "tp]rivate consen-
sual sex acts between adults are matters, absent evidence that they are
harmful, in which the state has no legitimate interest."1
218
217. 97 S. Ct. 485 (1976).
218. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1203 (E.D. Va. 1975) (Mehrige,
J., dissenting) (citations omitted), aff'd mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
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DEDICATION
This issue of the Quarterly is dedicated to Donald R. Wright in
commemoration and recognition of his most distinguished tenure as Chief
Justice of the California Supreme Court.
Chief Justice Wright came to the California Supreme Court with a
plethora of legal and judicial experience. He sat on municipal and superior
court benches as well as the court of appeal. In each of these positions, he
distinguished himself as a dedicated and thoroughly knowledgeable judge,
conscious of both the ideals and the realities of justice.
As the commentaries that survey some of his most significant opinions
attest, Chief Justice Wright was a preeminent legal scholar and a perceptive
administrator. As a result, he was more than an able leader of California's
judicial system; he was also an exemplar of individual courage and convic-
tion who was capable of leading the legal community as a whole, while
inspiring loyalty and respect. The numerous tributes to Chief Justice Wright
by his personal friends and colleagues further demonstrate that Donald
Wright was a man of exceptional integrity and compassion, a delightful
companion, and a warm friend.
It is to both the humane individual and the eminent jurist that we devote
this issue in the hope that these efforts will express our deep admiration and
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